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Abstract
Deep convolutional neural networks have become the gold standard for im-
age recognition tasks, demonstrating many current state-of-the-art results
and even achieving near-human level performance on some tasks. Despite
this fact it has been shown that their strong generalisation qualities can
be fooled to misclassify previously correctly classified natural images and
give erroneous high confidence classifications to nonsense synthetic im-
ages. In this paper we extend this work and present a straightforward
way to perturb any image in such a way as to cause it to acquire any
other label from within the dataset while leaving this perturbed image
visually indistinguishable from the original.
1 Introduction
Deep convolutional neural networks are currently at the forefront of image
classification tasks, reporting many state-of-the-art results, and indeed near-
human performance on large scale natural image benchmarks in recent years
(Krizhevsky et al. 2012; Szegedy et al. 2014; Schroff et al. 2015; He et al. 2015).
One longstanding assumption was that since these networks exhibit strong gen-
eralisation qualities to unseen test images they should also be stable with regards
to small perturbations of the input image - since such an image undoubtably
still contains an exemplar of the same class. This notion of stability has in fact
been shown to be false.
Work by Szegedy et al. (2014) was first to show that it is indeed possible to
find small perturbations of a given image (via a L-BFGS optimisation process)
that leave them visually indistinguishable from the original, but nonetheless
cause the network to misclassify the previously correctly classified exemplar.
Moreover these adversarial exemplars (the perturbed images) were shown to
generalise well across different classifiers that had different architectures. A
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similar result for generated images has been shown by Nguyen et al. (2014). In
this instance instead of starting with an exemplar, the optimisation proceeds
either from a random noise image or simply directly generates a synthetic image
with geometric patterns that are strongly classified as a particular class.
A plausible explaination for the ease at which these networks can be fooled
is given by Goodfellow et al. (2015). With the central problem being identified
as the move towards using somewhat linear functions at each layer due to the
ease at which they can be trained. This results in the representation space
being partitioned into halfspaces of increasingly confident but erroneous class
predictions as you move away from the distribution of the training exemplars.
In this paper an extension of previous work by Goodfellow et al. (2015) is
presented that shows that small perturbations of a correctly classified image
can be constructed in an efficient way that allows for the original image to be
re-assigned to any of the other classes while remaining visually indistinguisible.
Moreover this process is robust with respect to both initial and target class. In
Section 2 the implementation details of the relabelling process is discussed. In
Section 3 the results of relabelling experiments done on the ImageNet dataset
(Deng et al. 2009) are presented and some of the discovered limitations of the
relabelling process are discussed. Section 4 adds some analysis of how the rela-
belling manifests as changes to the representations of the intermediate layers of
the network.
2 Implementation
To explore the possibility that an input image (that on a trained network is
correctly classified) can be re-assigned to another label experiments were per-
formed with the Caffe framework (Jia et al. 2014)1. The Caffe framework is
particularly convenient for two reasons: The framework has publically avail-
able pre-trained implementations of "AlexNet" (Krizhevsky et al. 2012) and
"GoogLeNet" (Szegedy et al. 2014) and straightforward modifications of the
model definitions allow for the backpropagation when computing the gradients
to proceed right up to the input image layer. These gradients are then used to
update the input image in a batch of gradient descent updates.
Formally, given a network model with parameters θ, an input image X, a
"confusing" target label y and a cost function, L(θ,X, y). In the networks con-
sidered in this paper, L is the standard softmax function. When computing the
set of gradients, ∂L∂θ , we backpropagate one step further to that of the input im-
age X, yielding ∂L∂X . The process then proceeds like traditional gradient descent,
with N gradient updates occuring to the input image, X as follows
Xi+1 ← Xi − αf( ∂L
∂Xi
) (1)
The only remaining definition is the nature of the function, f in the above
equation. Initial testing showed that while using the raw gradient allowed for a
1available at: https://github.com/BVLC/caffe
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succesful relabelling of the input image, it was a destructive process leaving the
image with noticable blemishes unless very careful tuning of the update step,
α and the number of total iterations was undertaken. The problem with the
raw gradient (as seen in Figure 1) is that there are strong "hot-spots" where
the gradient values have a much larger magnitude than the surrounding average
value. This causes local regions of the image to be greatly modified at each
update step. As mentioned above this problem can be somewhat ameliorated by
scaling the gradient very small (i.e small α) while greatly increasing the number
of updates. However this is not ideal as it not only results in much longer
computation times but also makes the process quite brittle - as a key constraint
is that the resulting relabelled images remain visually indistinguishable from
the originals. Following the example of Goodfellow et al. (2015) rescaling the
gradient so that the relative strengths of the differing spatial locations is much
less severe is beneficial. This was accomplished by setting the function f to be
the signum which is then scaled by the quantisation factor of standard 8-bit
images, specifically
f(X) = sgn(X)/255.0 (2)
(a) ∂L
∂X
(b) sgn( ∂L
∂X
)
Figure 1: This figure shows the appearance of the gradients that are computed
on the first iteration when relabelling an image from class 10, to class 348. Notice
that the for the gradient passed through the sgn function (1(b)) the values are
much more spread out spatially, and each colour channel are bounded between
[-1/255,1/255]. This stops "hot spots" appearing in the image from the large
clustered values apparent in 1(a) when used in the gradient descent.
3 Image relabelling
To perform image relabelling we simply start the optimisation from the original
image, and provide a target label that we wish to assign the original image.
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Simlarly to Szegedy et al. (2014) we use the distortion measure defined as
distortion(x
′
, x) =
√∑
n(x
′
i − xi)2
n
(3)
where x is the original image, x
′
the relabelled image and n = 50176 is the
number of pixels in the image.
In Figure 2 we show the results of the above image relabelling process on
GoogLeNet, by choosing two exemplars at random from the ImageNet classes
‘Shih-Tzu’ and ‘Half-Track’ and swapping their labels. Average distortion mea-
sures from 30 such relabelling procedures was found to be 0.00814, which leaves
the altered images visually indistingusible from the originals. Figure 3 shows
the associated class probabilities, confirming that the relabelling process has
worked successfully. Furthermore the uncertainty of the relabelled image label
is consistently very low when compared to that of true images of the class.
It should be noted that the classes were chosen to ensure that the initial
experiments were on images that had significant qualitative features (consider
the differences in texture, dominant features, shapes, etc exhibited by exemplars
of these class) - so intuitively should be a ‘hard’ relabelling task and expressly
not due to any specific pre-screening process.
3.1 How robust is this process?
To see how applicable this process is across the entire 1000 image classes of
ImageNet, the following experiment was conducted. For each of the 1000 image
classes 10 random exemplars were chosen and relabelled to each of the 999 other
classes, with the caveat that the maximal distortion allowed for any relabelling
attempt be capped at 0.01 (see Figure 2 for examples of such distortion values).
This further restriction forces the relabelling to only be considered a success if
the altered image is still visually indistinguisible and is particularly stringent
in this regard as images that are corrupted with random noise which results in
distortion values magnitudes larger than 0.01, while obviously altered, are still
easily human-recognisible as the original class.
The results of this experiment were encouraging, with 98.7% of all class/target
pairs were successful at being re-labeled below the 0.01 distortion threshold. In
fact no class/target pairs were significantly harder to relabel at this distortion
level. This implies that it would be perfectly possible to construct an augmented
version of the ImageNet test set that would attain close to 0% accuracy, yet look
visually indistinguisible from the original.
The only parameters in the relabelling process are the update stepsize, α
and the number of iterations, N (which itself is a function of the maximal
distortion you will accept since the sgn( ∂L∂X ) is bounded at each step). In all the
simulations described in this paper α = 50 and the number of iterations were
tuned accordingly if a target distortion was required, or the process was simply
iterated until the relabelling process was sucessful. It is interesting to note that
the gradient is not stationary. Simply taking the first gradient and moving an
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Figure 2: Examples of class relabelling on GoogLeNet. Left: Original images
that are correctly classified as ‘Shih-Tzu’ and ‘Half-track’. Right: relabelled
images such that the classification output is reversed - i.e the ‘Shih-Tzu’ is now
strongly classified as ‘Half-track’ and vice-versa. Centre: Pixel differences mul-
tiplied by 10 and scaled to mean-level for visibility. The distortion introduced
in the top relableling was 0.00864 and the bottom 0.00712. These are a random
pair of images taken from the above classes that were chosen to be qualitatively
"maximally different". As we show in Section 3.1 relabelling is not sensitive to
the initial or target class.
equivalent distance in image space that would have arisen from many smaller
steps does not successfully re-label the image (though can often produce a mis-
classificaion). This tends to suggest that there is not a simple linear relationship
between the original image and the nearby perturbation that results in the new
target label being acquired.
Unfortunately there are some limitations to this relabelling scheme. The
changes to the image label are not robust to transformations of the image;
cropping, translating and mirroring the image results in the label reverting to the
correct one, which suggests that the perturbations are leveraging specific spatial
location in the process of relabelling. Furthermore, while the relabelling process
itself works with both GoogLeNet and AlexNet architectures (and probably
many similarly architected networks), images that are relabelled on one do not
transfer over to the other. All the experiments thus described have been carried
out on the GoogLeNet architecture, but similar results were obtained with the
AlexNet architecture and have been omitted for brevity.
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(a) Half track exemplar before relabelling.
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(b) Half track exemplar after relabelling.
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(c) ShihTzu exemplar before relabelling.
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(d) ShihTzu exemplar after relabelling.
Figure 3: The class probabilities for each of the four images in Fig 2. Notice
that after relabelling the uncertainty is also reduced.
3.2 Gaussian image synthesis
This relabelling process can also generate exemplars that are completely random
images devoid of human-recognisible structure, that are nonetheless classified
with a high confidence by simply starting the process with a random image.
Such a set of images can be shown in Figure 4.
4 Feature analysis
In an attempt to understand empirically what aspect of the network is failing
we have done some cursory testing of the representations of the network
A natural question to ask might be, are there any differences in the feature
space representation (i.e filter activations) between images that are relabelled
and those that are "true" members of the target class? To try and investigate
this at differing layers within GoogLeNet a SVM (with RBF kernel) was used
on the raw features generated before the final fully connected layer. Specifically,
50 images from random classes were relabelled to a single target class. Twenty
of these relabelled images, alongside 20 actual exemplars from the target class
were passed through GoogLeNet and the intermediary layer activations were
recorded. The features generated by these 40 images were used to train an SVM
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(a) Random gaussian image
before relabelling.
(b) Random gaussian image
after relabelling.
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(c) The class probabilities of the image be-
fore relabelling.
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(d) The class probabilities after relabelling.
Figure 4: These figures show a random gaussian image (4(a)) and the same
image after being re-labeled to class 348 (4(b)). The bottom two graphs show
the class probabilities before and after the relabelling process. The distortion
introduced in this relabelling process was 0.03 - which is much higher than
typically required to relabel natural images.
to see if the impostor relabelled images could be succesfully identified from these
feature representations alone. With 60 test features (30 of each type) the SVN
was succesfully able to identify the relabelled images with an average accuracy
of 89.6% over 10 random sets of images and targets.
This is interesting because it supports the idea that the relabelled images are
illiciting semantic "super responses" in the higher layer features. For example,
if we were to relabel an image of a dog to that of a truck, then perhaps the
best way to accomplish this is to trick the upper layers into detecting many,
many wheel shaped objects - in fact many more than would be expected even
in true truck images. In this way there should be quantitative differences in the
representations produced at intermediary layers - even though both ultimately
end up being classified as the same class.
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5 Discussion
This paper has described a method for confusing state-of-the-art deep convo-
lutional neural networks, by perturbing images from the ImageNet dataset in
such a way that they can be reassigned to any other class leaving the images
visually indistinguisible. It has also shown that creating a reassignment to a
specific target label involves multiple gradient evaluations; i.e there is not a
simple linear relationship to the nearby perturbation of an image that results
specific labels being acquired.
The existence of adversarial exemplars has strong implications for what ex-
actly the networks we have been training are actually learning from the data.
The fact that such simple methods described here can fool these networks sug-
gests that the information contained about image classes on even large datasets
like ImageNet are insufficient to allow for comprehensive, continuous general-
isation. Simple tranformations (flipping, cropping, etc) can provide some re-
sistance to pre-generated adversarial images, but this is far from a solution to
the underlying problem. The current optimisation paradigms, network archi-
tectures or indeed both are fundamentally insufficient to resist these kinds of
local instabilities.
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